US Pharm.
32(11):44-46.
It should not be a surprise to practicing pharmacists in the United States
that diethylstilbestrol (DES) should never be dispensed to pregnant women
because of the risks of cancer and other debilitating diseases to adults who
were exposed to the drug while still in the womb. Although this knowledge has
been available for the past three decades, it continues to be relevant today
because the adult DES sons and daughters continue to develop teratogenic
effects and now even some adult DES grandsons and granddaughters are
developing medical conditions linked to the use of DES.
DES was first prescribed in the 1940s by physicians as an off-label treatment
to prevent miscarriages in women who had experienced previous miscarriages. On
July 1, 1947, the FDA approved the first supplemental new drug application,
adding the prevention of miscarriage as an indication and approving 25-mg
tablets for this indication.1
It
has been estimated that between 1938 and 1971 as many as 4 million women in
the U.S. took DES.2 As early as 1953 it was known that DES did not
prevent miscarriage and other pregnancy complications. Despite this knowledge,
it was common for physicians in the U.S. to prescribe DES to pregnant women
for this reason. In 1971, a correlation was recognized between in utero DES
exposure and the development of clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and
cervix in the daughters of women who had taken DES during pregnancy.3
In that same year, the FDA issued a warning against the use of DES in
pregnant women. Notably, DES continued to be used in various European
countries until the early 1980s.4
Over the past few decades, courts have been asked to rule on the liability of
the manufacturers of the drug to DES children and grandchildren. Not
surprisingly, inquiries on these issues require going back into medical and
pharmacy records from the 1940s and 1950s. Another complication is that DES
was never patented, and as many as 200 manufacturers produced several
different dosage regimens. Combined, these factors make it fairly difficult
for the injured offspring to pick exactly which manufacturer made the
formulation consumed by the mother or grandmother. Many cases were dismissed
almost automatically for this reason.5 A recent case, however, sets
the stage for a much different outcome.6
Facts of the Case
The plaintiff, born in August 1965, claimed that while her mother was pregnant
with her, the mother was prescribed and consumed DES made by the defendant
drug manufacturer, Eli Lilly, and that she suffered damages as a result of her
exposure to DES in utero, including pregnancy complications, pregnancy losses,
and infertility. The plaintiff stated that she was born in Chanute, Kansas,
and has lived her entire life in Kansas. Her mother testified that from the
second month of her pregnancy in 1964 until her daughter was born, she took
DES as prescribed by Dr. Reuben Burkman. The mother said she always bought DES
from the Baker and Burkman Pharmacy. The pharmacy was attached to the clinic
building where Dr. Burkman practiced, and Dr. Burkman also owned the pharmacy.
(An odd arrangement from today's perspective, but it was not uncommon four or
five decades ago.) The mother said she took one small, round, red tablet four
times a day.
In
1964 and 1965, Eli Lilly made and sold DES in a 25-mg strength in round, red,
enteric-coated tablets. During those same years, Lilly's product information
recommended a dosage of 25 to 100 mg per day for the prevention of "accidents
of pregnancy." As noted above, it was common in that era to prescribe DES for
the prevention of miscarriage. There was evidence that Dr. Burkman often
prescribed the drug for such purposes.
In
the spring of 1965, Dr. Burkman hired Joan Augustine as a full-time nurse in
his clinic. She testified that she went into the pharmacy occasionally to "fix
up" a prescription when the pharmacist was not present. She could not recall
when she began helping with prescriptions, but knew she engaged in this
activity for some prescriptions in 1965. While she could not recall preparing
a prescription for the plaintiff's mother, or any other specific DES
prescriptions for other patients in 1965, she did remember that the pharmacy
stocked Lilly DES in little, red, enteric-coated tablets in 1965. She
indicated that the pharmacy carried DES only from Lilly and that the pharmacy
carried a lot of Lilly products. She could not recall specifically what dosage
the Lilly DES tablet came in.
Ms. Augustine also remembered that Dr. Burkman always had a Physicians' Desk
Reference (PDR) in each examining room. The court took judicial notice that
the PDRs for 1964 and 1965 contained only Lilly's DES listing and did not
mention any risk related to DES during pregnancy, either to the mother or the
fetus.
Trial Court Proceedings
Eli Lilly asked the trial judge to dismiss the case for various reasons. The
first was that the plaintiff could not prove that Eli Lilly was the
manufacturer of the DES that her mother took. It offered evidence that in 1964
and 1965, there were at least 95 other American manufacturers of DES that made
dosages in small, red, enteric-coated tablets. The court ruled that even if
this was true, it was not relevant because the only credible evidence,
provided by Ms. Augustine, was that the pharmacy stocked only Eli Lilly's
brand of DES. The court noted that Ms. Augustine testified that Dr. Burkman
commonly prescribed DES in 1965, that the pharmacy stocked Lilly's DES in
1965, and that the pharmacy carried a lot of Lilly products.
Eli Lilly next argued that there was no evidence that the pharmacy stocked its
25-mg DES product. The court disagreed and stated that while Ms. Augustine
cannot recall specifically what dosage the Lilly DES tablet came in, her
testimony did not exclude the possibility that Lilly's DES was available at
the pharmacy in other dosages. The judge also noted that despite the nurse's
uncertainty about the precise dosages of DES that the pharmacy dispensed, she
recalls only Lilly DES on the pharmacy shelf, and she believes that the
pharmacy carried DES only from Lilly. The judge concluded that with this
testimony, combined with that of the plaintiff's mother that she took a red
DES tablet in a 25-mg strength obtained from the Baker and Burkman Pharmacy, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Lilly manufactured the DES that the
plaintiff's mother ingested in 1965. The court therefore overruled this
portion of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Eli Lilly also argued that its alleged failure to warn Dr. Burkman about the
teratogenic effects of DES when taken by a pregnant woman was not the
proximate or legal cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. The parties
agreed that Kansas law would govern the legal proceedings. The products
liability law in Kansas does require the plaintiff to provide evidence that a
failure to warn was the proximate cause of her injuries. This law also
establishes a rebuttable presumption of causation once the plaintiff
establishes that a warning is inadequate. Here, said the judge, if the
plaintiff proves that Lilly failed to provide a proper warning, Kansas law
presumes that a doctor using that product would have heeded a proper warning.
The judge read the law to essentially presume that "but for the inadequate
warning, the patient would not have been harmed, since the doctor would have
given the patient an adequate warning if the doctor had ever received it, and
that the inadequate warning is therefore the cause of the patient's injury."
6 Under this scheme, the defendant is given an opportunity to rebut this
presumption by establishing that although the prescribing physician would have
read and heeded the warning or additional information, the warning would not
have changed the course of treatment. Put another way, the judge determined
that if Eli Lilly provides credible evidence to rebut the presumption, the
presumption disappears and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
affirmatively prove causation. In any event, the judge determined that there
was enough evidence to let a jury determine whether the information available
in 1964 and 1965 was sufficient to have required the defendant to warn against
prescribing DES to pregnant women.
Another interesting aspect of the lawsuit was that the plaintiff's husband
sued Eli Lilly for his "loss of consortium." This is a legal term that, in
essence, recognizes the right of a husband or wife to the company, affection,
and help of, and sexual relations with, his or her spouse. Eli Lilly argued
that the Kansas product liability law does not permit a loss of consortium
claim under the facts of this lawsuit because in 1965, when the plaintiff was
exposed to DES in utero, she was not married to her husband. The judge
disagreed. He could not see why he should bar the plaintiff's loss of
consortium claim when, at the time of marriage, the plaintiff's own claim had
not accrued because she had not suffered ascertainable injuries. He also noted
that although the plaintiff apparently suffered "substantial injury" in 1965
when she was exposed to DES, she may be able to show that she suffered
additional injuries when she attempted to become pregnant after she married
her husband.
At
the end of the day, the judge denied all of the defendant's motions to dismiss
the case and scheduled it for a jury trial. There have not been any reported
results of whether a trial did occur or if the parties settled the case before
the trial.
Analysis
How about the recall of that nurse from some 40 years ago? Her testimony was
the only reason that this case did not get thrown out of court, as has been
the outcome for thousands of cases just like this one. How the plaintiff or
her attorney found this saving angel and got her fabulous testimony might be a
story in itself.
Hindsight is always a wonderful teacher. But how much hindsight should be
allowed in a courtroom? It is very easy today to recognize the scientific fact
that DES is a teratogen and that giving this drug to pregnant women is wrong.
It is much more difficult to accurately state the degree of knowledge about
this issue 40 or 50 years ago. Consider for just a moment that none of the DES
manufacturers back then knew any of this information and that the science of
that era could not have reasonably predicted the harm to the unborn children
of mothers who were given this drug. Part of the problem is that when the
facts of a case like this are submitted to a jury, the jurors will be asked to
forget what we now know and to presume that the medical community was clueless
as to the dangers of this drug. Another aspect is that these same jurors are
looking at the DES son or daughter or maybe even the grandchild who comes to
court broken or diseased and completely innocent of ever having done something
to have prevented their medical problems. Compared to the big, well-funded,
and highly profitable drug manufacturers, it is not even a close bet on which
party is going to get the sympathy vote. You can see the cogs turning in the
minds of the jurors. Maybe the facts don't prove that Eli Lilly or any other
drug producer knew precisely back then that this drug was a time bomb waiting
to explode. Maybe the evidence isn't so great against the defendant, but the
maker of this drug now knows it does bad things, and the company has lots of
money. Compared to the injured and completely innocent plaintiff, the drug
company won't even feel a pinch if the jury gives the plaintiff a few million
bucks.
Put this way, it is perhaps a bit more palpable why judges have to be very
careful about which claims will be submitted to a jury and which ones should
be dismissed. Sympathy may be good for the soul, but it should never usurp
legitimate evidence and the rule of law. Otherwise, we deteriorate the
validity of the court system that Americans so cherish.
References
1. Dutton DB. Worse Than the Disease: Pitfalls of Medical Progress. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; 1988.
2. Schrager S, Potter BE. Diethylstilbestrol exposure. Am Fam Physician. 2004;69(10). Available at: www.aafp.org/afp/20040515/2395.html. Accessed October 21, 2007. Stillman RJ. In utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol: adverse effects on the reproductive tract and reproductive performance of male and female offspring. Am J Obstet Gynecol.1982;142:905-921.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 05-7134, US Ct App Columba, 488 F.3d 1026; 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 13295, November 17, 2006. Argued, June 8, 2007, Decided, Rehearing, en banc, denied, by Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21094 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 29, 2007). Rehearing denied by Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21105 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 29, 2007); and Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 95-4924., US APP 11th Cir, 131 F.3d 1447; 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 36321; CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P15,138; 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 892, December 29, 1997, Decided, as Amended January 15, 1998.
6. Baughn v. Eli Lilly, Slip Op No 03-2626-KHV (February 17, 2005), 356 F Supp 2d 1177; 2005 US Dist Lexis 2379.
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